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PREFACE 
In all industrialized countries environmental, health, and safety standards are, and 
will long remain, basic instruments of regulatory policy. International agencies like the 
World Health Organization and the International Labor Office are actively engaged in 
developing internationally accepted standards. At the same time, the standard-setting pro-
cess rests on precarious conceptual, scientific, and economic foundations. This contradic-
tion poses delicate problems both at the national and at the international level. On the one 
hand, the demand for conclusive scientific evidence before a standard is adopted is more 
likely to delay public action than to improve the quality of decision making; on the other 
hand, ill-understood differences in methodology and regulatory philosophies seriously 
impede international cooperation in this area. 
The two papers included in this report explore different aspects of standard-setting, 
and are presented as contributions toward a better understanding of the scientific and insti-
tutional complexities of the process. The first paper on "The Uncertain Logic of Standard 
Setting" is mainly concerned with the technical aspects, while the second paper, "Preven-
tion and Health Standards: American, Soviet, and European Models", focuses on interna-
tional comparisons. A certain amount of duplication is explained by the desire to make 
each paper self-contained. 
Environmental and health problems have always loomed large in IIASA's research 
agenda. The current research plan emphasizes the interactions between scientific research, 
institutions, and environmental policies. The papers collected here are part of this collective 
effort and could not have been written without the intellectual exchange with scholars from 
different countries and socioeconomic system~ that is such a unique feature of IIASA. 
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The Uncertain Logic of Standard-Setting 
Giandomenico Majone, Laxenburg, Austria 
Abstract 
Environmental standards are, and will long remain, basic instruments of regu-
latory policy. At the same time, the standard-setting process rests on precarious 
conceptual foundations. This contradiction poses severe problems of administra-
tive rationality and political legitimacy. 
After a discussion of the major sources of uncertainty in standard setting, the 
paper argues that a fundamental restructuring of procedures, institutions, and 
evaluative criteria is needed. Two directions of regulatory reform are outlined. 
First, statutory regulations should be replaced as much as possible by non-
statutory codes and standards. Second, greater attention should be paid to the pro-
cedural aspects of standard setting than has so far been the case. 
Introduction 
It is a truism, but one which is too often forgotten, that decision processes in gen-
eral, and regulatory decision making in particular, vary greatly according to sub-
ject matter (e.g., the activity, process, or substance to be regulated), cognitive phi-
losophy, ideological stance, available knowledge and skills, institutional setting, 
and so on. As Philip Selznick has observed in a different context, [d]ecision-making 
is one of those fashionable phrases that may well obscure more than it illu-
minates ... 
The general features of all choices, or of all social choice, may some day be convinc-
ingly stated. But it will still be necessary to distinguish the more and the less 
trivial; and, if there is any order in this phenomenon, to identify some kinds of 
decisions, linking them to the distinctive problems or situations out of which they 
arise1. 
1 Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, New York: Harper and Ro w, 1964, p. 56. 
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As Selznick suggests, there may be too much variety in S1'cial choices to justify a 
single analytic approach or a single criterion of rationality. Yet, the tendency still 
prevailing in policy analysis is to force all kinds of decision problems into the Pro-
crustean bed of "comprehensive rational analysis". The same stereotyped cat-
egories, the same models, the same evaluative criteria are applied to regulatory 
decisions regardless of specific differences and special circumstances. 
Even conceding that some economy of thought may have been achieved, the cost in 
terms of understanding the standard-setting process in all its complexity has been, 
I suspect, too high. For example, differences in biological philosophy, conflicting 
views concerning the degree to which the human body can overcome the effects of 
toxic agents and pollutants, uncertainty about dose-response relationships, or the 
institutional context in which environmental inspectors operate, hardly play any 
role in most policy analyses of environmental regulation. 
However, such factors have an enormous influence on the regulatory process. Dif-
ferences in biological philosophy, for example, are the main reason for the striking 
differences between many Soviet and Western health standards2. 
An oversimplified view of the environmental problem also pervades most current 
debates on the choice of regulatory tools. It is one thing to show that under certain 
idealized conditions pollution taxes are the most efficient (hence "rational"!) policy 
instruments. It is quite another thing to argue that such taxes should be used in 
practice, in spite of inadequate scientific and economic data, institutional 
problems, and the general reluctance of legislators, administrators, and the public 
to follow the economists' advice and accept economic efficiency as the basic 
criterion of social choice. 
The analyst who evaluates environmental policies by the sole criterion of economic 
efficiency actually has something in common with the environmentalist who 
advocates regulation based exclusively on health criteria. For both of them, the 
important thing is outcome, not process; both are interested in the decisions that 
are made, not how they are made. 
Evaluating social choices by their outcomes has a strong intuitive appeal, but pre-
supposes the existence of some unambiguous measure of outcome. When the 
correctness or fairness of the outcome can be determined unambiguously, the man-
ner in which the decision is taken is largely immaterial - only results count. But 
when the factual and value premises are debatable, the consequences highly uncer-
tain, when there is no consensus on evaluative criteria - then the process or proce-
dure of decision making acquires special significance. This, as Niklas Luhmann has 
2 Giandomenico Majone, "The New Perspective on Health: Prevention and Health Standards", Laxen-
burg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, PP-81-6, March 1981. 
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shown, is the fundamental insight on which the classical theories of judicial, 
legislative, and administrative procedures are based. 
Regulators have traditionally sought legitimacy for their decisions by wrapping 
them in a cloak of scientific respectability . Their determinations (they claim) are 
firmly based on scientific analyses made by qualified experts. But the cognitive 
and institutional complexity of pollution control and risk evaluation has dispelled 
the initial faith in the power of such experts. As this paper attempts to show, the 
scientific and conceptual basis of environmental regulation is so precarious , the 
empirical evidence so ambiguous, that most regulatory decisions can only be eval-
uated and legitimated in terms of procedural, rather than substantive, rationality 
- by process, not by outcome. 
The Conceptual Basis of Regulation 
Environmental and health standards are derived, and used, differently in different 
countries . A major source of variations lies in differences in the definition of what 
is a state of health, and conflicting views concerning the degree to which the 
defense mechanisms of the body can be safely drawn upon to offset the effects of 
toxic agents and pollutants. 
Toxicological procedures used in the West rely on the idea that no threat to health 
exists so long as the exposure does not induce a disturbance that overloads the 
normal protective mechanisms of the body. On the other hand, Soviet toxicologists 
maintain that any change in the normal response to a stimulus represents an unac-
ceptable deviation from normal conditions, and any concentration, however small, 
places an undesirable toxic or nuisance stress on the organism. Thus, a potential 
for ill-health is assumed to exist as soon as the organism undergoes the first 
detectable change of whatever kind from its normal state3. 
To better visualize these conceptual differences, imagine the familiar dose-
response curve (for example, curve A in Figure 1 below) as being subdivided into 
three zones : an upper zone corresponding to high doses of a toxic substance, where 
~ll-effects due to exposure are clearly detectable; a compensatory zone where the 
body adjusts to the stresses imposed by lower levels of exposure, but at some cost; 
and, finally, a lower, homeostatic zone where the adjustments are automatic. 
According to the biological philosophy prevailing in the West, the defense 
mechanisms in the compensatory zone, as well as the normal adaptive processes in 
the homeostatic zone, can be safely drawn upon, within limits, to offset the levels 
3 Roger I. Glass, "A perspective on environmental health in the USSR", Archives of Environmental 
Health, vol. 30, August 1975, pp. 391 - 395. 
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of stress imposed by minimum exposure to hazardous agents at the workplace and 
in the environment, just as they are called upon to counter the wear and tear of 
ordinary life. Hence, dose-response relationships are extrapolated downward from 
the zone of demonstrable health burdens to a point of "non-detectable" ill effects4. 
Soviet toxicologists start at the other end of the dose-response curve, moving 
upwards from zero dose and a corresponding initial benchmark of normality in the 
test organism. The permissible level of exposure is established below the lowest 
dose needed to induce a statistically significant difference from the normal state, 
as revealed by highly sensitive measures of behavioral response. The assumption 
underlying this procedure is that the protective mechanisms in both homeostatic 
and compensatory zones should be kept in reserve to ward off unexpected toxic 
effects, and their effectiveness should not be weakened by the continuous demands 
of stress knowingly permitted in the environment or at the workplace. 
Neither the Soviet nor the western position can be dismissed as being unreasonable 
or contrary to known biological laws, but the practical implications in terms of 
acceptable levels of exposure are vastly different in the two cases. The official goal 
of Soviet standard-setters is a zero level of exposure. By contrast, goals of zero 
exposure have not been seriously discussed in the United States or in other 
countries in the West, except for radiation protection and for carcinogens in the 
workplace5. 
Conceptual differences concerning the nature of health and the adaptive capacity 
of the human organism are magnified by differences in research techniques. Soviet 
toxicologists place major emphasis on studying the effects of toxic agents on the 
nervous system. Central nervous system sensitivity (conditioned reflexes, elec-
troencephalograms) and reflex responses (changes in heart und respiratory rates, 
in blood pressure, and so on) play a central role in standard setting. In the words of 
a Soviet expert 
We attach great significance to chronic changes in the higher nervous activity of animals 
under the influence of toxic substances in the air they breathe. We believe that changes in the 
functioning of the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres occur very early, even with small con-
centrations; since the cerebral cortex is highly sensitive to the effects of external factors in 
the environment ... One of the early manifestations of the influence of various chemical sub-
stances on the higher nervous system is the development of phasic states. Later, disinhibi-
tion of differentiation occurs, then individual reflexes begin to disappear and finally none of 
the reflex pattern is left. When the animal is more severely affected, the natural conditioned 
reflex to the sight and smell of food disappears6. 
4 Theodore F. Hatch, "Permissible levels of exposure to hazardous agents in industry" , Journal of 
Occupational Medicine, vol. 14, 1972, pp. 134-137. 
5 lb .. p. 135. 
6 V. A. Rjazanov, "Criteria and methods for establishing maximum permissible concentrations of air 
pollution", Bulletin of the World Health Organization, vol. 32, 1965, p. 392. 
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Because of this preoccupation with the role of the higher nervous system as con-
troller of all bodily activity, considerably more importance is given to the patho-
logy of this system than is the case in Western studies7. Incidentally, the interest of 
Soviet toxicologists in the nervous system and reflex behavior can be explained by 
the enormous influence of Pavlovian theories on all domains of Soviet medicine8• 
In particular, the insistence on testing the nervous system is justified by reference 
to Pavlov's theory that living organisms adapt to their environment by means of 
two nervous mechanisms: the unconditioned reflexes for the permanent features of 
the environment, and the conditioned reflexes for temporary (conditional) fea-
tures . 
American and European scientists, while not fully convinced that tests of the 
nervous system necessarily provide more sensitive indicators of toxic action, agree 
that sophisticated measurements of nervous-system effects should be a more 
important part of toxicological testing in the West9. 
Another interesting methodological difference is the limited role which epidemio-
logy seems to play in standard setting in the Soviet Union. In the West, and par-
ticularly in the United States, epidemiology has historically provided important, 
and sometimes decisive, evidence on which standards have been based, although 
there are indications that its role may be decreasing relative to toxicological test-
ing. For the Soviets , on the other hand, epidemiological studies represent a form of 
human experimentation in which prior toxicological tests and subsequent preven-
tion have failed. In short, epidemiological studies represent a reactive rather than 
a preventative approach . Moreover, epidemiological studies abroad, showing the 
effects on health of concentrations higher than those allowed in the Soviet Union, 
encourage continued faith in the value of the traditional toxicological approach 
that has led to the lower Soviet concentrations10. 
Scientific Uncertainty in Standard-Setting 
Extrapolation is a key step in the establishment of environmental and health stan-
dards, and a good part of the uncertainty inherent in standard setting originates in 
various types of extrapolation processes. Consider, first, the problem of extra-
polating from animal experiments. 
7 Bertram D. Dinman, "Development of workplace environment standards in foreign countries, Part 1 ", 
Journal of Occupational Medicine, vol. 18, no. 6, 1976, pp. 409 - 417. 
8 Mark G. Field, Soviet Socialized Medicine, New York: The Free Press, 1967, ch. 9. 
9 Dinman, cit. 
10 Glass, cit. 
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A major issue in toxicology is the determination of the animal species that best pre-
dicts the response of man. Would the same species be equally predictive for all 
pollutants being tested? Do species differ in the degree to which they can predict 
toxicity for specific organ systems - kidney, liver, lungs, and so on? Which 
"animal model" best simulates the pregnant woman, the new-born child, or indi-
viduals with inadequate diet or genetic deficiencies? 
There are no unequivocal answers to such questions. Thus, many researchers have 
criticized the excessive use of rodents as predictive models because rodents are 
phylogenetically further removed from humans than other species, such as the dog 
or the monkey. However, a scientific panel of the United States Food and Drug 
Administration on carcinogenesis has not recommended the general use of the dog 
in the testing of chemical carcinogenesis because of its large size and relatively 
long life-span11. 
There is, in fact, little hope that one species could provide the broad range of pre-
dictive potential needed to assess the responses of a highly heterogeneous human 
population to different types of pollutants . Predictions could be improved by 
using multiple species in toxicological experiments. But heterogeneity in human 
populations is often social in origin, and social conditions cannot be reproduced in 
the toxicologist's laboratory. 
The issue of human heterogeneity also arises in connection with the prediction of 
adverse health effects on individuals who are (or may be) at high risk with respect 
to certain pollutants. Once the toxic dose for the "normal healthy" population has 
been derived, consideration must be given to high-risk groups, i.e., "those indi-
viduals who experience toxic and/or carcinogenic effects significantly before the 
general population as a result of one or more biological factors, including develop-
mental influences, genetic factors, nutritional inadequacies, disease conditions, 
and behavioral or life style characteristics"l2. Thus, children and adults with 
vitamin C deficiency are hypersensitive to ozone and to a number of heavy metals; 
pregnant women, to lead and carbon monoxide; people with asthmatic and chronic 
respiratory diseases, to respiratory irritants such as nitrogen dioxide, ozone, and 
sulfur dioxide. 
Standards developed for statistically "normal" individuals should be adjusted (by 
downward extrapolation or some other means) in order to protect the sections of 
the population at high risk. Unfortunately, high-risk groups are seldom considered 
specifically and separately in setting environmental and health standards, except 
11 Food und Drug Administration Advisory Committee on Protocols for Safety Evaluation. Panel on 
Carcinogenesis: "Report on cancer testing in the safety evaluation of food additives and pesticides". 
Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology vol. 20, 1971, pp. 419-438. 
12 Edward J. Calabrese, Methodological Approaches to Deriving Environmental and Occupational 
Health Standards, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978, p. 47. 
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perhaps through the dubious device of "safety factors" (see below). There are 
several reasons for this neglect; for example, lack of detailed exposure informa-
tion, and the widespread assumption that high-risk groups represent a negligible 
percentage of the population. But recent research indicates that the number of 
high-risk individuals is quite large in some cases, and can include significant per-
centages of the population of specific racial ancestries 13. 
Strictly speaking, each individual has a unique genetic composition and life 
history, and thus a unique response to environmental pollutants. This hetero-
geneity of human populations leaves public authorities with an almost impossible 
regulatory task. In an effort to find a way out of this dilemma, toxicologists and 
statisticians have developed several mathematical models expressing the pro-
bability of a lifetime response, P , as a function of dosage D: P = f(D). This is the 
dose-response function; different models are obtained, with different choices off . 
Data points 
t 
I 
exposure levels 
0 2 3 4 5 6 
Dose-- ---
7 
• 
Observed 
dose range 
B 9 
Figure 1: Downward extrapolation with different dose-response functions 
Source : E . J . Calabrese, Methodological Approaches to Deriving Environmental and Occu-
pational Health Standards, Wiley-Interscience, 1978, 131. 
13 Ib., pp. 48- 59. 
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Figure 1 shows three choices of the extrapolating function from the many possible 
options. Although all three choices are consistent with the data points at high dose 
levels, their policy implications are quite different. Curve A represents the tradi-
tional threshold (nonlinear) dose-response model. Using A, it would be possible to 
establish a "virtually safe" level of exposure at dose 3, even though high doses 
produce adverse health effects. Curve B represents a linear (nonthreshold) dose-
response relationship: adverse health effects occur at every level of pollutant 
exposure and there is no obvious point at which a reasonable standard could be set. 
Finally, the dose-response relationship expressed by curve C is linear at high and 
moderate doses, but at lower doses it indicates more serious health effects than the 
linear model would have predicted. 
More sophisticated models consider the distribution of responses to different dose 
levels over the experimental population. Then f(D) becomes the density of the pro-
bability distribution of responses, and the proportion of the population that will 
respond to a dose level D0 ist given by the cumulative function 
J 
Do 
P(D0) = f(D)dD 
0 
Thus P(O) = 0 (i.e., there is no spontaneous occurrence of the particular response), 
and P(oo) = 1 (i.e., no immune group exists within the population; all members will 
respond to sufficiently high doses). 
A virtually safe dose (VSD) is now defined as a dose level D0 such that P(D0) :s: P 0, 
where P 0 is some preassigned small probability such as 10-B (the value favored by 
many toxicologists) or 10-6 (the value used, for example, by the U.S . Food and 
Drug Administration). The VSD can be computed as soon as f is known. 
But this is precisely the problem: how do we determine f? The usual procedure con-
sists in fitting a curve (by one of many available methods) to the observations in 
the observable range, and then extrapolating downward to the unobservable 
response P 0 to determine the VSD. 
There are three major problems with this procedure. First, the choice of function 
has a major effect on the value of the VSD - more than 100,000-fold according to 
the Advisory Committee on Safety Evaluation of the Food and Drug Administra-
tion. Second, the different extrapolating functions often cannot be distinguished 
from each other in the range of the observable responses. Finally, no firm scientific 
basis now exists for choosing among the different possibilitiesI4• An additional 
problem with downward extrapolation (an empirical rather than a mathematical 
14 Jerome Cornfield, "Carcinogenic risk assessment", Science, vol. 198, 18 November 1977, pp. 693- 699. 
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problem) is that high-dose exposure to pollutants may totally swamp many protec-
tive mechanisms of the body that function at low-level exposures. 
Why, it may be asked, are test animals exposed to levels of toxic substances far in 
excess of those to which humans would be exposed under normal circumstances -
thus making downward extrapolation necessary? This is done in order to com-
pensate for the small samples of animals usually tested. 
For example, if we assume that a chemical agent will cause cancer in 1 out of 10,000 
people who are exposed to it, and that humans and test animals do not differ signi-
ficantly in sensitivity with respect to the given agent, it would be necessary to test 
at least 10,000 animals (but preferably something like 30,000 animals) in order to 
detect one case of cancer. 
With 1000 test animals and an unacceptably low confidence level of 90 %, the upper 
confidence limit for a negative experiment (no cancer induced at the given dose 
level) is 2.3 cancers per 1000 tests. "No one could wish to introduce an agent into a 
human population for which no more could be said than that it would probably 
produce no more than 2 tumors per 1000. To reduce the upper limit of risk to 2 
tumors per one million with confidence coefficient 0.999 would require a negative 
result in somewhat more than three million test animals" 15 . 
In practice, no more than 50 or so animals are usually available per dose level ; 
hence the use of high doses on small samples of animals. To reduce the experi-
mental doses, and thus the unreliability of extrapolations outside the experi-
mental range, one could think of conducting experiments with extremely large 
numbers of animals . Such "megamouse" experiments have in fact been proposed ; 
but the costs would be prohibitive, and the validity of the conclusions still doubt-
ful because of the problems connected with human heterogeneity and extrap o]; . 
tions from animal tests . 
Unable to find clean theoretical solutions, standard-setters dea l with the uncer-
tainty of toxicological predictions by means of various rules of thumb - safety 
factors, for example. Often a safety factor of 100 is used , meaning that test animals 
should show no adverse health effects from a given pollutant when exposed to 
doses at least 100 times greater than the likely human dose. This particular rule of 
thumb is sometimes justified by the reasoning that man may be t en times more 
sensitive than the experimental animals used, and that there may be in addition a 
tenfold variation in sensitivity among individuals . 
This is all rather speculative and, besides, how does one justify the safety factors of 
50 or 500 which are also in use? 
15 Food and Drug A dm inist ration, "Report on cancer testing" , cit. , p. 431. 
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Competing Regulatory Philosophies 
It may be argued that if there is no firm scientific basis for choosing among the dif-
ferent mathematical models, then one should prefer the safest or most conserva-
tive procedure. One problem with the conservatism argument is that it is not clear 
where one should stopl6. A no-threshold model is more conservative than one that 
admits the existence of thresholds for carcinogenic effects. But within the large 
class of no-threshold models many degrees of conservatism are possible. Again, in 
designing a toxicological experiment one could use the most sensitive species, the 
most sensitive strain within species, and so on down to the level of the most sensi-
tive individual animal, thus obtaining 100 percent incidence at each dose level. In 
short, it is difficult to be conservative in a consistent manner, unless one is pre-
pared to propose a zero level of exposure in each case. 
As a decision rule, conservatism in the face of risk is as unsatisfactory as the min-
imax or the "most likely event" principles, or indeed any principle that does not 
balance expected risks against expected benefits. On the other hand, the only con-
sistent (Bayesian) decision procedure requires information - prior probabilities of 
all possible scientific hypotheses, utilities for all possible consequences - which 
no regulator is likely to supply. 
What about determining acceptable levels of exposure on the basis of a cost-benefit 
or risk-benefit analysis? There are, of course, well-known difficulties in quan-
tifying benefits, costs, and risks . The danger that the estimates represent little 
more than disguised value judgments is always present. Problems of quantifica-
tion aside, a number of rather stringent conditions must be satisfied before the 
cost-benefit criterion may be meaningfully used as a decision rule in health regula-
tion. 
First, it has long been recognized that cost-benefit analysis is not applicable under 
extreme circumstances, for example, when potential health damage is so large that 
marginal tradeoffs between the risks and the benefits of certain kinds of activity 
become virtually meaningless. Also, price-based marginal calculations (and the 
tcitonnement procedures necessary to discover a correct set of prices) are hardly 
appropriate when immediate action is required. To use Martin Weitzman's 
example, suppose that a certain number of airplanes is required for an emergency 
operation. In strict economic terms, it would be inefficient to issue orders to diffe-
rent commercial airlines to supply a given number of airplanes, since marginal 
opportunity costs will typically vary from company to company. Yet, in practical 
terms, this approach would be preferable to the economically correct procedure of 
announcing a price for plane services and letting profit-maximizing companies 
16 Cornfield, cit. 
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decide on the number of planes they would be willing to commit to the rescue 
operation17. 
A third case in which the relevance of the approach is doubtful is when the 
biological effect of the toxicant to be regulated becomes evident only after a long 
time (perhaps 20 to 30 years). If people are unaware of such long-run effects, no 
externalities are generated and the cost-benefit criterion would indicate a status 
quo policy - a solution which most toxicologists would consider irresponsible. 
Moreover, pollutants such as cadmium, mercury, or radioactive wastes, which 
deteriorate very slowly over time, pose particular problems, since the damage they 
cause arises mostly from an irreducible stock, while only incremental damage is 
caused by the flow of pollution. Now, it is a basic assumption of the marginal cal-
culus that the relevant variables can be controlled in all directions. In the case of 
persistent pollutants the stock of pollution is, to all practical purposes, irreducible, 
so that an essential feature of the cost-benefit approach is missing in this toxi-
cologically important situation. 
Perhaps the most serious difficulties in using cost-benefit criteria in standard set-
ting arise in connection with the dynamic aspects of pollutant exposure. It can be 
shown that in a biologically unstable situation, a standard set at the point where 
marginal net benefits equal external costs - corresponding to a "Pareto-
optimum" level of pollution - may fail to prevent continuing environmental dete-
rioration and eventual destruction of the ability of organisms to cope with the per-
missible level of pollution is. 
Aside from the technical and conceptual limitations of cost-benefit analysis, a key 
issue of regulatory philosophy is the role that considerations other than health and 
the environment should play in the standard-setting process. Debate on this issue 
has been particularly intense in the United States, and American legislation shows 
quite clearly the difficulty of reaching a consensus on the basic principles of regula-
tion. 
Thus, while the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Federal Environmental Pes-
ticide Control Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metics Act (with the exception of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958), and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) call for some balancing of costs and 
benefits, the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are silent on this issue. 
17 Martin L. Weitzman , "Prices vs . quantities'', Review of Economic Studies, vol. 41, October 1974, pp. 
477-491. 
18 David Pearce, "The limits of cost-benefit analysis as a guide to environmental policy", Kyklos, vol. 29, 
Fasc. 1, 1976, pp . 97 -112. 
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Even when the law requires some balancing of costs and benefits, the language is 
often ambiguous. In the case of the OSH Act, for example, the courts had to 
determine whether Section 6(b) (5) of the Act, which speaks only of feasibility 
("The Secretary ... shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the 
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity .. . "), permits OSHA to 
consider economic as well as technological factors in setting standards for toxic 
substances. 
Since Congress has set few coherent guidelines on the extent to which benefits, as 
well as costs and risks, must be considered, regulators have to rely on ad hoc proce-
dures to somehow balance these incommensurable factors. A former director of the 
Office of Toxic Substances of the Environmental Protection Agency has described 
the process: 
Usually the procedure is to postulate a numerical standard for a toxic chemical or a specific 
type of limitation on the use of the chemical, with the restriction designed to reduce environ-
mental levels to the point that concerns over health or environmental damage disappear. 
Then an assessment is carried out to see if the favorable environmental impact from the 
restriction warrants the concomitant economic costs . If the costs are too high, the level of 
control is adjusted until an appropriate balance is reached 19. 
It is interesting to compare this approach with the philosophy of Soviet regulators 
(and of many scientists in both East and West). 
Health standards, Soviet authorities maintain, should be based on health effects 
alone, without regard to the availability of adequate control technology, to 
economic feasibility, or even to the ability to adequately measure the concentra-
tions in practice. A currently unattainable standard can still represent a guideline 
for enforcement and an incentive for future research in control technology. 
Conversely, since technically or economically attainable concentrations will 
coincide with harmless concentrations only by chance, standards based on consid-
erations of economic or technical feasibility "can act only as an obstacle to the 
search for better techniques, ... they sanction what has already been achieved with-
out stimulating new technical advances"20. 
Since "scientifically based" standards cannot al ways be achieved, the Soviets also 
use secondary ("sanitary") standards that may modify, for a limited period of time, 
the requirements set by the primary ("hygienic") standards. Professor V. A . Rja-
zanov, a leading toxicologist, distinguishes between the two types of standards (in 
the context of air pollution) in the following terms: 
19 Glenn E. Schweitzer, "Toxic chemicals and regulatory decision making : philosophy and practicality", 
in National Academy of Sciences, Decision Making for Regulating Chemicals in the Environment, 
Washington, D.C.: 1975, pp. 72-73. 
20 Rjazanov, cit., p. 390. 
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Hygienic standards ... must in themselves reflect the scientifically based ideal towards which 
we must strive in order to ensure that the public is not subject to unfavorable effects from air 
pollution. This ideal cannot be achieved always and everywhere a t a given time. Therefore, 
alongside the general hygienic standards for maximum permissible concentrations, there 
may be sanitary standards of a temporary character, serving the needs of the moment . They 
may modify for a defined period the requirements for cleanliness of the exte rnal atmosphere, 
taking into account economic and technological factors ... Such air pollution standards are 
permissible temporarily, but should be abandoned after a certain period, during which the 
condition of the air must be brought into conformity with the hygienic standards. If this 
approach is adopted, hygienic standards for the cleanliness of the atmosphere will not be 
used to sanction existing technical achievement, but will represent the goal towards which 
wemuststrive21. 
The criticism that standards used in the West tend to codify existing economic and 
technical conditions, to the detriment of their normative character, has some valid-
ity. It is often said that one of the main goals of environmental or health standards 
is to channel growth away from hazardous industries and materials toward safer 
forms of production and employment. But it is hard to see how a "feasible" stand-
ard (in the sense in which this term has been recently used) can provide the 
necessary signals. Consider, for example, the history of OSHA regulation of the 
carcinogen vinyl chloride (VC). 
In April 1974, OSHA promulgated an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) 
reducing the previous National Consensus Standard for vinylchloride from 500 
parts per million (ppm) to 50 ppm. The National Consensus Standard of pre-OSHA 
times was a standard proposed by the American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists, and voluntarily accepted by industry, at a time when it was 
unknown that VC could induce cancer. The statement of reasons supporting the 
ETS reveals that the 50 ppm standard was an uneasy compromise between conflict-
ing considerations and interests . 
During the summer of 1974, OSHA held intensive hearings on the proposal for a 
permanent standard of 1 ppm (as a time-weighted average over an 8-hour work per-
iod, with permissible excursions up to 5 ppm averaged over any 15-minute period). 
Although the disagreement on the medical evidence was considerable, most of the 
debate concerned the "feasibility" of the proposal. Industry opposed the proposed 
level of 1 ppm on the grounds that OSHA lacked sufficient evidence on the 
harmfulness of VC at low doses; that it was technologically impossible to meet the 
1 ppm ceiling; and that the cost of approaching the ceiling would force the com-
panies out of business . Conceding industry's claims of infeasibility, OSHA finally 
promulgated a somewhat weakened permanent standard·. 
21 Ib., p. 390. 
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Subsequent experience was to show that meeting the 1 ppm level was neither as 
difficult nor as costly as industry had predicted. The permanent VC standard lacks 
explicit criteria of feasibility, but a careful case study comes to the conclusion that 
"OSHA's statements and actions suggest that it was following an unarticulated 
principle that a standard is not feasible if it would cause more than slight changes 
in the number of firms in an industry, or in an industry's profit and growth rates, 
its output, and competitive position"22. 
The case of the vinyl chloride standard is far from being unique. American regu-
lators are constantly urged to treat economic and technical feasibility as important 
considerations in the derivation of health and environmental standards. The result 
of these pressures has been an increasing confusion of the conceptually distinct 
stages of standard-setting and standard-using. The notion of aggregating scientific, 
technical, economic, and political data into a single value is appealing, but in 
practice it has led to logically inconsistent conclusions. The meaning of the numeri-
cal value chosen for a given standard becomes ambiguous, representing neither a 
policy goal, nor a scientific judgment of health risk, nor even (since the standards 
are supposed to be enforceable at the national level) a measure of the level of 
protection that can be reasonably achieved in specific local situations. Whatever 
reservations one might have about the logic of the distinction drawn by Soviet 
regulators between primary and secondary standards, it must be admitted that at 
least it allows a clear statement of objectives, while avoiding the danger of 
sanctioning existing technical and economic conditions. 
Regulatory Reform: Some Suggestions 
It is time to draw some conclusions from the preceding discussion. Environmental 
and health standards are, and will long remain, basic instruments of regulatory 
policy. At the same time, the standard-setting process rests on precarious con-
ceptual, scientific, and economic foundations. This contradiction poses almost 
insoluble problems of administrative rationality and legitimacy. For example, the 
demand for "conclusive" scientific evidence or thorough risk analyses before a 
standard is adopted is more likely to delay public action than to improve the qual-
ity of decision-making, and to generate dissension rather than consensus. 
What is needed is a fundamental restructuring of procedures, institutions, and 
evaluative criteria along. lines that explicitly recognize the uncertainty and com-
plexity of regulatory decisions. Two directions of regulatory reform seem to be 
22 David D. Doniger, The Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, p . 65. 
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particularly important. First, statutory regulations should be replaced as much as 
possible by non-statutory codes and standards; in particular, standard-setting 
should be clearly distinguished from standard-using. Although emphasis on com-
pulsory standards is more characteristic of recent American legislation, pressure 
for statutory regulation is also building up in several European countries (in part 
as a result of the activities of environmentalist groups), and at the level of the 
European Community. 
Second, greater attention should be paid to the procedural aspects of standard-set-
ting than has so far been the case. With the present state of knowledge, it is unrea-
listic to require that regulatory decisions be supported by "proof" in the strict 
sense of the word. But cognitive uncertainty, far from justifying carelessness in 
choosing among alternative data, theories, and methodologies, in fact demands 
strong procedural controls to make sure that the implications of these choices are 
explored from a variety of viewpoints, and to facilitate a detailed factual analysis 
of the intellectual merits of the conclusions . 
Concerning the first point - the need for greater regulatory flexibility - it is clear 
that environmental and health standards should be revised as scientific knowledge 
improves, empirical evidence accumulates, and socioeconomic conditions change. 
However, frequent revisions are unlikely (or very costly) when standards are 
embedded in legal codes. Also, the more uncertain the scientific basis of regulation 
and the greater the need for flexibility and adaptability, the more discretion 
should be left to the regulatory agency. But statutory regulation sets narrow limits 
to administrative discretion . 
The experience of a number of European countries, particularly in the area of 
occupational health, shows that an effective regulatory system can be operated 
without heavy reliance on legally enforceable standards. In the Federal Republic 
of Germany and in France, maximum acceptable concentrations (MACs) for toxic 
substances and other environmental limits are not embedded in legal codes but are 
used by the inspectors - together with other information on the physical, chem-
ical, and toxicological characteristics of different substances - for giving preven-
tive advice and monitoring working and environmental conditions. MAC values 
and numerical standards are typically based on health criteria only. Guidelines 
interpreting the standards in the light of technical and economic constraints are 
issued by separate governmental commissions, such as the German Committee for 
Dangerous Materials in the Workplace (Ausschu.B fi.ir gefahrliche Arbeitsstoffe) set 
up by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 
In the United Kingdom, too, occupational health standards have no specific legal 
status, but are used by the Factory Inspectorate of the Department of Employment 
for control and surveillance of working conditions. A strong case for greater 
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reliance on voluntary standards and codes is presented in the official report of the 
Parliamentary Committee appointed in May 1970 under the chairmanship of Lord 
Robens. Although the report deals with occupational health and safety, many of its 
arguments have more wide-ranging validity. The following recommendations of 
the Robens Committee are particularly relevant to the present argument: 
D Wherever practicable, regulations should be confined to statements of the broad 
objectives to be achieved. 
D In future, no statutory regulation should be made before detailed consideration 
has been given to whether objectives might adequately be met by anon-statutory 
standard or code of practice. 
D Greater emphasis should be placed on standard-setting by means of non-
statutory codes and standards. As a general rule, statutory regulations should 
only be made when the non-statutory alternatives have been fully explored and 
found wanting. 
D The whole regulatory system should be more flexible and more discriminating. 
Industry should be encouraged to deal with more of its own problems, thereby 
enabling official regulation to be more effectively concentrated on serious 
problems where strict official regulation is appropriate and necessary23. 
These recommendations express the belief that statutory regulations are largely 
ineffective, intrinsically rigid, and have a built-in tendency to become obsolete 
quite rapidly. On the other hand, "standards and codes developed within industry 
and by independent bodies are, over a large part of the field, more practical and 
therefore potentially more effective instruments of progress than statutory regula-
tions"24. The Report concludes that what is needed is "less law" and more provision 
for voluntary self-regulation at the plant level. 
However, in order to provide credible sanctions when needed, inspectors should 
have the power, without reference to the courts, to issue formal Improvement 
Notices, i.e., orders to comply not only with any relevant statutory regulation, but 
also with any relevant voluntary code or standard that has been formally 
approved by the Authority for Safety and Health at Work. Voluntary codes and 
standards would also be admissible evidence in proceedings before tribunals (the 
Report suggests that appeals against improvement notices should be heard not in 
the criminal courts but by the industrial tribunals set up under the 1964 Industrial 
Training Act). In cases where serious hazards or imminent dangers exist, the 
inspector could issue a Prohibition Notice ordering that, in the event of non-
compliance within the stated time limit, the use of specified plant, machinery, pro-
23 Safety and Health at Work , Report of the Committee 1970- 1972, Chairman Lord Robens, London: H. 
M. Stationery Office, Cm 5034, 1972, pp. 44 - 46. 
24 lb., p. 48. 
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cesses or premises must be discontinued, or continued only under specific condi-
tions. 
But ensuring compliance with minimum legal requirements is not the main task of 
the inspectorate. Rather, inspectors should be concerned with the broad aspects of 
safety and health at the workplaces they visit, as much as with those narrow 
aspects which may have been the subject of detailed statutory regulations. "We 
believe", the Report states, "that, as a matter of explicit policy, the provision of 
skilled and impartial advice and assistance should be the leading edge of the 
unified inspectorate"25. 
The second direction of reform is concerned with what Herbert Simon has called 
"procedural rationality". In situations characterized by great uncertainty and cog-
nitive complexity, Simon argues, "we must give an account not only of substantive 
rationality - the extent to which appropriate courses of action are chosen - but 
also of procedural rationality - the effectiveness, in light of human cognitive pow-
ers and limitations, of the procedures used to choose actions"26. 
Policy analysis has been traditionally concerned with the problem of choosing the 
best means to achieve given ends. The basic conceptual categories of the policy 
analyst - goals, alternatives, impacts, effectiveness, choice - clearly reveal his 
deep commitment to a teleological conception of policy making. According to this 
conception, rationality means maximizing something; it means choosing the best 
alternative, subject to a set of constraints. Hence the preoccupation with methods 
of analysis and evaluation that emphasize outcome rather than process, and the 
interest in what decisions are made, rather than in how they are made. As a result, 
policy analysis lacks the methodological equivalents of legal notions like reasoned 
decision, proper form, and rules of evidence. 
This indifference toward procedures and the formal layout of arguments is jus-
tifiable under the assumption that there is "one best way" of making a decision or, 
if several methods are possible, that there is a well-defined rule for choosing 
among them. This is certainly not the situation in standard-setting. Here, Jerome 
Cornfield points out, "[a]ll present safety evaluation procedures ... must be 
regarded as mathematical formalisms whose correspondence with the realities of 
low dose effects is, and may long remain, largely conjectural"27. Thus, the most 
important problem is not determining the "correct" value for a certain standard -
is it 5 or 2 ppm? - but which criteria and procedures should be used to choose 
among competing models, approaches, and regulatory philosophies. 
25 Ib., p. 65. 
26 Herbert A. Simon, "Rationality as process and as product of thought", American Economic Associa-
tion Proceedings, vol. 68, May 1978, p. 90. 
27 Cornfield, cit., p. 698. 
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In other words, the main problem with many environmental policy decisions is not 
that they are, in some sense, suboptimal (we generally lack the scientific and 
medical knowledge to know what the correct decision should be), but that they 
leave much to be desired in terms of procedural rationality. Standard-setters often 
fail to probe deeply into the quality of the available evidence, or to test the sen-
sitivity of the chosen model to uncertainty and alternative assumptions. Even 
more commonly, the methodology used in reasoning from the data to a proposed 
standard is so informal that it is impossible to retrace the steps of the agency's 
argument and its factual basis. Again, the standard-setting process usually does 
not include any procedures specifically designed to bring out unstated assump-
tions, differing interpretations, and gaps in logic or in the empirical evidence. 
An interesting example of procedural reform in the area of environmental regula-
tion comes from the United States. Here the courts have recently developed "paper 
hearing" procedures that combine many of the advantages of a trial-type 
adversary process (without oral testimony and cross-examination), while advoid-
ing undue costs and delays in decision-making. The procedural requirements 
imposed by the courts on the Environmental Protection Agency have been sum-
marized by Pedersen:2B 
First, both the essential factual data on which the rule is based and the methodology used in 
reasoning from the data to the proposed standard must be disclosed for comment at the time 
a rule is proposed ... Second, the agency's discussion of the basis and purpose of its rule - gen-
erally contained in the "preambles" to the notices of proposed and final rule-making and in 
the accompanying technical support documents - must detail the steps of the agency's 
reasoning and its factual basis . Third, significant comments received during the public com-
ment period must be answered at the time of final promulgation. However, comments must 
meet a standard of detail equal to that required of the agency in promulgating its rule before 
they will be considered significant. Fourth, only objections to the regulations which were 
raised with some specificity during the public comment period, and to which the agency thus 
had an opportunity to respond, may be raised during judicial review. 
Although these requirements are only a first step, and much remains to be done in 
reducing the ineffectiveness and rigidity of the present system and its built-in 
tendency to become obsolete, there is already some evidence of improvement in the 
quality of environmental decision making. Data and technical studies are collected 
and organized more systematically; external criticism is explicitly taken into · 
account so that policies reflect a broader range of considerations and interests; the 
various subunits of the regulatory agency are motivated to coordinate their assess-
ments, methodologies, and conclusions. The new procedures should also increase 
the influence of the people who, because of their special knowledge, are more 
directly involved in standard-setting. 
28 W. F. Pedersen, Jr. "Formal records and informal rule making", Yale Law Journal, vol. 85, 1975, pp. 75, 
76. 
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I would argue that the experience of the "paper hearing" procedures developed at 
EPA under the Clean Air Act has general relevance. The requirement of an open 
record that includes the factual and methodological bases of an agency's conclu-
sions, as well as external criticism and responses to such criticism, is always a 
powerful incentive to more careful agency deliberations. The need to improve the 
intellectual quality of administrative deliberations is not, however, the only 
reason why procedural questions are so important today. In situations of great 
complexity and cognitive uncertainty it is essential that the groups affected should 
be willing to accept the outcome of the administrative process even before this has 
been determined. By ensuring adequate representation of conflicting opinions and 
examining a wide range of alternatives, well-designed procedures can greatly 
improve not only the rationality but also the legitimacy of regulatory decisions. 
Zusammenfassung 
Umweltstandards sind die grundlegenden Instrumente regulatorischer Politik 
und werden es noch lange sein, obwohl der Proze8 der Fixierung von Standards auf 
fragwiirdigen Grundlagen beruht. Diese Widerspriichlichkeit fiihrt zu ernsten 
Problemen der Rationalitat des Verwaltungshandelns und der politischen Legi-
timation. 
Auf der Basis einer Diskussion der hauptsachlichen Quellen von Unsicherheit im 
Proze8 der Standardsetzung argumentiert der Autor zugunsten einer grundle-
genden Veranderung der Prozesse, Institutionen und der Bewertungskriterien. 
Dabei werden zwei Richtungen einer regulatorischen Reform vorgeschlagen: 
Zunachst ein moglichst weitgehender Ersatz gesetzlicher Regulierungen durch 
nicht gesetzliche Regeln und Standards; zum zweiten sollte den proze8bezogenen 
Aspekten der Standardsetzung starkere Beachtung geschenkt werden als es bisher 
der Fall war. 

Prevention and Health Standards: 
American, Soviet, and European 
Models 
Giandomenico Majone, University of Calabria (Italy) 
Abstract. This paper explores some significant sources of variation in the 
way health standards are derived and used in various countries: differences in 
biological and regulatory philosophies, in enforcement strategies, and in institu-
tional arrangements. Such cross-national variations raise a number of questions 
about the process of standard-setting. Among the issues discussed here are the 
nature of the trade-off between long-run goals and feasibility criteria that 
merely codify current technical and economic practice, and the possibility of 
replacing statutory regulation by self-regulation and non-statutory codes and 
standards. 
Standard-setting in a comparative perspective 
The growing debate over preventive approaches to health problems can-
not proceed far without encountering issues related to environmental and 
occupational health. A country's commitment to prevention may be judged 
from the way it goes about protecting the living and working environment 
of its citizens. In this area of public policy, significant changes have taken 
place during the last decade in all major industrialized countries. Nowhere 
have these changes been more remarkable than in the United States, where 
a series of legislative enactments-including the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 1970, the Amendments to the Clean Air Act passed in the 
same year, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, and the Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976-has generated a major shift away from policies based 
on decentralized control and voluntary compliance, and toward compulsory 
regulation set at the national level. 
In all these legislative enactments, standards appear as the most im-
portant policy tool for the prevention of accidents, ill health, and environ-
mental degradation. In fact, American regulatory philosophy, especially in 
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the field of occupational health and safety, is moving away from the ap-
proach prevailing in Western Europe-where standards are typically used 
as general guidelines, to be flexibly interpreted by inspectors to fit each 
particular case. The present American approach comes closer, in some 
respects, to the practice of the Soviet Union-where standards are em-
bodied in legally binding codes, and public health is defined as the science 
of setting "optimal" health standards. 
Standards play different roles in different countries, and their numerical 
values also vary a good deal from country to country. For example, it is 
well known that Soviet environmental and occupational health standards 
are typically much more stringent than those applied in the United States 
or Western Europe. Such cross-national variations raise a number of ques-
tions about the nature of the standard-setting process, and about the cogni-
tive, philosophic, and institutional factors that shape that process. 
In this as in other areas of policymaking, comparative analysis repre-
sents a convenient method for exposing hidden assumptions and unques-
tioned beliefs. More important, comparative analysis shows that the setting 
of health standards, far from being an almost mechanical process that can 
be safely delegated to technicians, in reality represents a microcosm in 
which national traditions, philosophies, attitudes, and institutions are 
faithfully reflected. 
The insights contributed by a comparative perspective have practical im-
plications as well as intellectual interest. Consider, for example, the fact 
that even in the United States-with its enormous scientific, technical, and 
financial resources-no more than 500 chemicals can be tested each year 
because of the limited availability of trained toxicologists, laboratory facili-
ties, and test animals. This is barely sufficient to keep up with the flow of 
new chemicals, let alone to investigate the existing stock of well over 50,000 
chemicals already in commercial use. International cooperation in toxico-
logical testing would have obvious benefits; but serious (if ill-understood) 
differences in methodology, risk philosophies, and regulatory approaches 
make cooperation difficult, and even reduce the value of the limited amount 
of information that is available. 
Although all industrialized and most developing countries make exten-
sive use of environmental and health standards, much of the research from 
which these standards are derived is done in a handful of countries-pri-
marily the United States and the Soviet Union. But both independent veri-
fication of research results and intelligent adaptation of those results to 
particular national situations are difficult because of the abundance of 
implicit assumptions and the lack of standardized procedures. The result is 
a mechanical adoption of "foreign" standards, barely disguised by ad hoc 
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manipulations of safety factors and other rules of thumb. Errors of fact and 
logic in the original derivations are propagated and magnified in the 
process. 
In the field of environmental and occupational health, we may have 
reached a point where fine-tuning of intrinsically inadequate regulatory 
mechanisms (such as requiring formal cost-benefit analyses in setting com-
pulsory standards) can only serve to impede truly innovative thinking. 
Probably the most important contribution that comparative analysis can 
make is to reveal the variety of institutional solutions that are possible, and 
that have in fact been used, or at least proposed, in different national 
contexts. 
The following pages explore some sources of variation in the way health 
standards are derived and used in different countries-differences in cogni-
tive paradigms, in regulatory philosophies, and in enforcement procedures. 
This analysis will provide the empirical support for some comments about 
the uses and limitations of health standards. The possibility of voluntary 
standards and self-regulation will be discussed in the latter part of the 
paper. 
The conceptual basis of standard-setting 
The derivation of health standards in various countries reflects, first of 
all, differences in the definition of what is a state of health, as well as con-
flicting views concerning the degree to which the defense mechanisms of 
the body can be safely drawn upon to offset insults from toxic agents and 
pollutants. 
Toxicological procedures used in the West rely on the idea that no threat 
to health exists so long as the exposure does not induce a disturbance that 
overloads the normal protective mechanisms of the body. For example, the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences defines non-adverse health effects to 
include all changes that ( 1) do not result in impairment of functional 
capacity or the ability to compensate for additional stress; ( 2) are reversi-
ble following cessation of exposure, so long as no detectable decrements in 
the ability of the organism to maintain homeostasis occur; and ( 3) do not 
enhance the susceptibility of the organism to the deleterious effects of other 
environmental influences.1 According to Soviet biological philosophy, on 
the other hand, any change in response to stimulus represents an unaccept-
able deviation from normal conditions, and any concentration, however 
small, places an undesirable toxic or nuisance stress on the organism. Thus 
in the Soviet Union a potential for ill health is said to exist as soon as the 
organism undergoes the first detectable change of whatever kind from its 
normal state. 2 
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To better visualize these conceptual differences, imagine the familiar 
dose-response curve as being subdivided into three zones : an upper zone 
corresponding to high doses of a toxic substance, where ill effects due to 
exposure are clearly detectable; a compensatory zone, where the body ad-
justs to the stresses imposed by lower levels of exposure, but at some cost; 
and a lower, homeostatic zone, where the adjustments are automatic. Ac-
cording to the biological philosophy prevailing in the West, the defense 
mechanisms in the compensatory zone, as well as the normal adaptive 
processes in the homeostatic zone, can (within limits) be safely drawn 
upon to offset the levels of stress imposed by minimum exposure to hazard-
ous agents at the workplace and in the environment, just as they are called 
upon to counter the wear and tear of ordinary life. Hence, dose-response 
relationships are extrapolated downward from the zone of demonstrable 
health burdens to a point of "non-detectable" ill effects. 3 
Soviet toxicologists start at the other end of the dose-response curve, 
moving upward from zero dose and a corresponding initial benchmark of 
normality in the test organism. The permissible level of exposure is estab-
lished below the lowest dose needed to induce a statistically significant dif-
ference from the normal state, as revealed by highly sensitive measures of 
behavioral response. The assumption underlying this procedure is that the 
protective mechanisms in both homeostatic and compensatory zones should 
be kept in reserve to take care of unexpected insults, and their effectiveness 
should not be weakened by the continuous demands of stress knowingly 
permitted in the environment or at the workplace. 
Neither the Soviet nor the Western position can be dismissed as being 
unreasonable or contrary to known biological laws; but the practical impli-
cations in terms of acceptable levels of exposure are vastly different in the 
two cases. The official goal of Soviet standard-setters is a zero level of 
exposure. By contrast, goals of zero exposure have not been seriously dis-
cussed in the United States or in other countries in the West, except for 
protection from radiation and from carcinogens in the workplace." 
Conceptual differences concerning the nature of health and the adaptive 
capacity of the human organism are magnified by differences in research 
techniques. Soviet toxicologists place major emphasis on the study of the 
effects of toxic agents on the nervous system. Central-nervous-system sensi-
tivity (conditioned reflexes, electroencephalogram) and reflex responses 
(changes in heart and respiratory rate, in blood pressure, and so on) play 
a central role in standard setting. In the words of a Soviet expert: 5 
We attach great significance to chronic changes in the higher nervous 
activity of animals under the influence of toxic substances in the air 
they breathe. We believe that changes in the functioning of the cortex 
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of the cerebral hemispheres occur very early, even with small con-
centrations, since the cerebral cortex is highly sensitive to the effects 
of external factors in the environment. . . . One of the early mani-
festations of the influence of various chemical substances on the higher 
nervous system is the development of phasic states. Later, disinhibition 
of differentiation occurs, then individual reflexes begin to disappear 
and finally none of the reflex pattern is left. When the animal is more 
severely affected, the natural conditioned reflex to sight and smell of 
food disappears. 
Because of this preoccupation with the role of the higher nervous system 
as controller of all bodily activity, Soviet studies pay considerably more 
attention to the pathology of this system than do Western studies. 6 The 
interest of Soviet toxicologists in nervous-system testing and reflex behavior 
can be explained by the enormous influence of Pavlovian theories on all 
domains of Soviet medicine. 7 In particular, the insistence on nervous-system 
testing is justified by reference to Pavlov's theory that living organisms 
adapt to their environment by means of two nervous mechanisms: the 
unconditioned reflexes for the permanent features of the environment, and 
the conditioned reflexes for the temporary (conditional) features. Although 
American and European scientists are not fully convinced that nervous-
system testing necessarily provides more sensitive indicators of toxic action, 
they do agree that sophisticated measurements of nervous-system effects 
should be a more important p(l.rt of toxicological testing in the West. 8 
Another interesting methodological difference is the limited role which 
epidemiology seems to play in standard-setting in the Soviet Union. In the 
West, and particularly in the United States, epidemiology has historically 
provided important and sometimes decisive evidence on which standards 
have been based, although there are indications that its role may be de-
creasing relative to toxicological testing. For the Soviets, on the other hand, 
epidemiological studies represent a form of human experimentation under-
taken only after toxicological tests and prevention have failed. In short, the 
Soviets believe that epidemiological studies represent a reactive rather than 
a preventive approach; moreover, foreign epidemiological studies that only 
show health effects for most substances at higher concentrations than those 
allowed in the Soviet Union encourage continued faith in the value of the 
traditional approach-based on toxicological evidence largely derived from 
nervous-system testing-that has led to the stricter Soviet standards.9 
Differences in regulatory philosophies 
Health standards, Soviet authorities maintain, should be based on health 
effects alone, without regard to the availability of adequate control tech-
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nology, to economic feasibility, or even to the ability to adequately measure 
the concentrations in practice. A currently unattainable standard can still 
represent a guideline for enforcement and an incentive for future research 
in control technology. Conversely, since technically or economically at-
tainable concentrations will coincide with harmless concentrations only by 
chance, standards based on considerations of economic or technical feasi-
bility "can act only as an obstacle to the search for better techniques, . . . 
they sanction what has already been achieved without stimulating new 
technical advances. " 10 
Since "scientifically based" standards cannot always be achieved, the 
Soviets also set secondary ("sanitary" ) standards that may modify, for a 
limited period of time, the requirements set by the primary ("hygienic") 
standards. Professor V. A. Rjazanov, a leading toxicologist, distinguishes 
the two types of standards (in the context of air pollution) in the following 
terms :11 
Hygienic standards . . . must in themselves reflect the scientifically 
based ideal towards which we must strive in order to ensure that the 
public is not subject to unfavorable effects from air pollution. This 
ideal cannot be achieved always and everywhere at a given time. 
Therefore, alongside the general hygienic standards for maximum per-
missible concentrations, there may be sanitary standards of a tem-
porary character, serving the needs of the moment. They may modify 
for a defined period the requirements for cleanliness of the external 
atmosphere, taking into account economic and technological factors . 
. . . Such air pollution standards are permissible temporarily, but 
should be abandoned after a certain period, during which the condi-
tion of the air must be brought into conformity with the hygienic 
standards. If this approach is adopted, hygienic standards for the 
cleanness of the external air will not be used to sanction existing 
technical achievement, but will represent the goal towards which we 
must strive. 
Such a distinction between primary and secondary ("feasible") standards 
is not unknown in the West. In the United States, for example, there is the 
traditional distinction between criteria (which express the available scien-
tific knowledge of the relationship between pollutants or toxic substances 
and their adverse effects on man and his environment) and prescriptive 
standards (which are norms established by some authority to govern 
action) .1 2 
Criteria are supposed to provide the scientific basis for the establishment 
of standards, and the two stages of the standard-setting process-the scien-
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tific and the regulatory-are sometimes kept institutionally separate. Thus 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), in the 
Department of Health and Human Services, has responsibility for develop-
ing criteria, while the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), in the Department of Labor, sets standards guided by the criteria 
proposed by NIOSH. 
However, the distinction between criteria and standards does not exactly 
correspond to that between primary and secondary standards. For example, 
NIOSH criteria are based not only on considerations of health and safety, 
but also on the feasibility of control within existing technology. 1 3 It has 
even been claimed that NIOSH criteria and recommendations are some-
times influenced by political considerations: 11 
NIOSH is to arrive at the "best scientific judgment," objectively deter-
mined, on what constitutes safe exposures. However, in two cases 
NIOSH recommended criteria at variance with what was suggested by 
the scientific evidence alone. NIOSH recommended 90 dBA as an 
eight-hour noise exposure limit, eventually to go down to 85 dBA. 
Either level clearly causes a fair amount of hearing loss and takes no 
account of nonauditory effects. The NIOSH recommendation that the 
asbestos standard be set at 5 fibers per cc until 1976 ... is another 
example of how politicized the "objective" recommendations of 
NIOSH are. 
On the whole, environmental and occupational health legislation in the 
United States appears to be rather inconsistent on the role which non-
health, particularly economic, considerations should play in the standard-
setting process. Thus, while the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (with the exception of the Food 
Additives Amendment of 1958) call for some weighing of the costs and 
benefits of regulation, the Clean Air Act Amendments, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
are silent on this issue. 
Even when the law requires some balancing of costs and benefits, the 
language is often ambiguous. In the case of the OSH Act, for example, the 
courts had to determine whether Section 6(b) (5) of the act, which only 
speaks of feasibility ("The Secretary . . . shall set the standard which 
most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best 
available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of 
health or functional capacity"), permits OSHA to consider economic as 
well as technological factors in setting standards for toxic substances. 
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Since Congress has set few coherent guidelines on the extent to which 
benefits, as well as costs and risks, must be considered, regulators have to 
rely on ad hoc procedures to balance somehow these incommensurable fac-
tors. As a director of the Office of Toxic Substances of the Environmental 
Protection Agency has described the process: 10 
Usually the procedure is to postulate a numerical standard for a toxic 
chemical or a specific type of limitation on the use of the chemical, 
with the restriction designed to reduce environmental levels to the 
point that concerns over health or environmental damage disappear. 
Then an assessment is carried out to see if the favorable environmen-
tal impact from the restriction warrants the concomitant economic 
costs. If the costs are too high, the level of control is adjusted until an 
appropriate balance is reached. 
Because of the ambiguity of the legislative mandate, much current debate 
on health regulation has focused on whether the benefits and costs of spe-
cific health standards should be evaluated explicitly (possibly through a 
formal cost-benefit analysis) or implicitly, through bargaining and the po-
litical process. The outside observer cannot help being puzzled by this pre-
occupation with the fine-tuning of a mechanism-compulsory national stan-
dards-that seems to be intrinsically incapable of dealing with the myriad 
local situations and problems that constitute the environmental or occupa-
tional-health problem in a country the size of the United States. The fol-
lowing pages point out the limitations of compulsory standards as tools of 
public health policy, and discuss institutional conditions under which 
voluntary standards may provide a more adequate solution. 
Before proceeding with the argument, however, it should be noted that 
even an unambiguous choice in favor of "health-only" criteria, as in the 
Soviet model, removes only some of the uncertainty and subjectivity that 
is inherent in the standard-setting process. The inadequacy of the scientific 
basis of regulation remains. For example, it has already been mentioned 
that the procedures used by toxicologists to determine "virtually safe doses" 
( VSD) for exposure to carcinogens involve extrapolations downward from 
the range of observed effects. While a variety of equally plausible mathe-
matical functions may be used in the extrapolation procedure, the choice 
of function has a major effect on the determination of the VSD-more than 
100,000-fold according to estimates of the Advisory Committee on Safety 
Evaluation of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. 16 Equally uncertain 
is the relevance of animal experiments for the determination of human 
carcinogenic risks. In fact, scientific certainty in regulation is so elusive 
that, according to the suggestion of an experienced scientist, 11 
Majone • Prevention and Health Standards 637 
All things considered, it would seem reasonable that until better meth-
ods for the definition of relative toxicity can be found, the role of 
science in regulation should be limited to those instances where nearly 
certain assessment of human risk is feasible and legitimate; at the same 
time more emphasis should be given to methodological and basic 
research for future application. 
Standard-setting and standard-using 
The formal process of adoption of health standards in the Soviet Union 
is quite straightforward. Government selects a scientific review committee 
that first surveys the literature and the exposure data and then makes rec-
ommendations to the Ministry of Health. If the ministry agrees, these 
recommendations become nationwide regulations. Enforcement is the re-
sponsibility of the Ministry of Health (through the Sanitary Epidemiology 
Service, Sanepid), of inspectors from the All Union Councils (primarily 
engineers), and of inspectors from local trade-union committees. Sanepid-
with a staff of some 120,000 people, including 45,000 physicians-is re-
sponsible for both research and practice in preventive medicine and envi-
ronmental and occupational health. Public health physicians, paramedical 
personnel (feldshers) , and chemists in 4,500 Sanepid stations monitor 
pollutant levels, oversee the enforcement of standards, and participate in 
all health aspects of community planning. 
But full enforcement of the existing standards is often impossible, be-
cause the standards are numerous and in most cases very stringent. Hence, 
as already noted, temporary secondary standards, which take economic and 
technical constraints into consideration, are allowed. Conflicts between per-
mitting a violation and closing down a plant appear to be fairly common, 
and are generally resolved through bargaining between Sanepid inspectors, 
local government, and the industry in question. According to observers 
from the West, the extreme step of closing a plant is resorted to infre-
quently, and only after a period of arbitration involving the superiors of the 
local Sanepid inspector and the local industry manager. 18 
The apparent contradiction between the theory and the practice of 
standard-setting in the Soviet Union raises an interesting issue. One could 
argue that although their primary standards are typically much more strin-
gent than those used in the West, actual differences tend to disappear at 
the level of enforcement. In more general terms, an approach combining 
stringent standards with "reasonable" enforcement could produce about 
the same results as a system of more realistic standards but stricter 
enforcement. 
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The proposition is plausible, but unfortunately no data are available to 
test it. And even if empirical testing were possible, it would be necessary to 
be extremely careful in drawing conclusions. A result of "no significant 
difference," for example, would not tell us much about the long-run impli-
cations of the two approaches. Soviet regulators insist that even when their 
standards are not fully satisfied, "they represent the ultimate goal and 
enable us to assess, in each individual case, how far we have advanced in 
this difficult task."19 They criticize standards used in the West for codify-
ing existing economic and technical conditions, to the detriment of their 
normative character. 
The point is well taken, if one assumes that the Jong-term effect of an 
environmental or occupational health standard should be to channel growth 
away from industries and materials that are hazardous to health and to-
ward safer forms of production and employment. It is, in fact, hard to see 
how a "feasible" standard can provide the necessary signals. Consider, 
for example, the history of OSHA regulation of the carcinogen vinyl 
chloride (VC). 
In April 1974, OSHA promulgated an Emergency Temporary Standard 
(ETS) reducing the previous National Consensus Standard from 500 parts 
per million (ppm) to 50 ppm. The National Consensus Standard of pre-
OSHA times was a standard proposed by the American Conference of Gov-
ernmental Industrial Hygienists, and voluntarily accepted by industry, at 
a time when it was unknown that VC could induce cancer. The statement 
of reasons supporting the ETS reveals that the 50 ppm standard was an 
uneasy compromise between conflicting considerations and interests. 
During the summer of 1974, OSHA held extensive hearings on the pro-
posal for a permanent standard of l ppm (as a time-weighted average over 
an eight-hour work period, with permissible excursions up to 5 ppm aver-
aged over any fifteen-minute period). Although the disagreement on the 
medical evidence was considerable, most of the debate concerned the 
"feasibility" of the proposal. Industry opposed the proposed level of 1 ppm 
on the grounds that OSHA Jacked sufficient evidence on the harmfulness 
of VC at low doses; that it was technologically impossible to meet the 
1 ppm ceiling; and that the cost of approaching the ceiling would force the 
companies out of business. Conceding the industry's claims of infeasibility, 
OSHA finally promulgated a somewhat weakened permanent standard. 
Subsequent experience was to show that meeting the 1 ppm level was 
not as difficult or costly as industry had predicted. The permanent VC 
standard Jacks explicit criteria of feasibility; but a careful case study comes 
to the conclusion that "OSHA's statements and actions suggest that it was 
following an unarticulated principle that a standard is not feasible if it 
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would cause more than slight changes in the number of firms in an industry, 
or in an industry's profit and growth rates, its output, and competitive 
position. " 20 
The case of the vinyl chloride standard is far from unique: American 
regulators are constantly urged to treat economic and technical feasibility 
as important considerations in the derivation of health standards. Respond-
ing to these pressures, regulators tend increasingly to conflate the concep-
tually distinct stages of standard-setting and standard-using. The resulting 
aggregation of scientific, technical, economic, and political criteria is not 
only ad hoc, but also logically inscrutable. 21 As a consequence, the mean-
ing of the numerical value chosen for a given standard is ambiguous, rep-
resenting neither a policy goal, nor a scientific judgment of health risk, nor 
even (since the standards are supposed to be enforceable at the national 
level) a measure of the level of protection that can be reasonably achieved 
in specific local situations. Whatever reservations one might have about the 
logic of the distinction drawn by Soviet regulators between primary and 
secondary standards, it must be admitted that at least it allows a clear state-
ment of objectives, while avoiding the danger of sanctioning existing tech-
nical and economic conditions. 
So far I have stressed the differences between the Soviet and the Ameri-
can approach. Despite these differences, both countries are now committed 
to a regulatory structure that relies on national mandatory standards; 
hence both are faced by the same intrinsic limitations of this method of 
control. Mandatory standards focus the attention of operators and inspec-
tors on a small set of permissible values and approved practices, at the 
expense of more comprehensive assessments of the overall quality of am-
bient or workplace environment. The logic of statutory control is such that 
it is difficult to differentiate between the important and the trivial, between 
form and substance. With no formal place for discretion in technical inter-
pretation, the situation becomes one of either compliance or breach. 
Moreover, given the limited knowledge available today in toxicology, 
radiation biology, epidemiology, and related fields, the numerical precision 
of current standards is spurious. At the same time, rigid statutory control 
does not allow the frequent revisions that a steady flow of new evidence 
would require. Nor can general regulations be written with enough spe-
cificity to accommodate all the unique conditions encountered in the mil-
lions of workplaces and thousands of communities of a large industrialized 
country. 
Critics of the existing regulatory structure have used the inadequacies of 
mandatory standards as proof of the need to place greater reliance on 
economic incentives. It has been suggested, for example, that employers be 
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induced to provide safer workplaces by means of an "injury tax," in the 
form of a surcharge-a certain percentage of an employer's total injury 
loss-which would raise the marginal benefits of injury prevention. This 
critical literature has its counterpart in the area of environmental problems. 
Here, too, the administrative approach to pollution control, based on stan-
dards and prohibitions, has been criticized for its lack of effectiveness and 
for its tendency to become "a political process entailing bargaining be-
tween parties of unequal power."22 Effluent charges and related price-based 
techniques have been proposed as alternative approaches that by their 
automatism "would reduce the scope for administrative discretion and 
bargaining. " 2 3 
But these normative conclusions overlook one important point. The same 
forces that influence and distort the standard-setting process will also affect 
other approaches, perhaps by different means. The supposed contrast be-
tween an uncorrupted system of effluent charges (or injury taxes) and a 
regulatory machinery captured by interest groups is a specious one. In fact, 
as I have shown elsewhere, where effluent charges have been used (e.g., in 
France), they have proved to be as subject to bargaining and as condi-
tioned by the institutional framework as standards, licenses, and other 
administrative measures. 24 
There is no reason to believe that market-oriented approaches to occu-
pational safety and health would fare better. At any rate, solutions that are 
(theoretically) more efficient will also be more desirable only to the extent 
that economic efficiency is accepted as the overriding criterion of public 
policy. In the area of environmental and occupational health such con-
sensus on values seems to be lacking. Policy actors realize that the choice 
between standards and prices is not a technical choice between policy tools 
that are in themselves neutral, but rather a decision between alternative 
institutional frameworks which reward different groups differently. Hence 
some actors may recognize that standards are less efficient than economic 
incentives, and at the same time, without being inconsistent, support an 
inefficient regulatory machinery in which they have a greater voice. 
This, I would argue, is the basic reason for the support given by Ameri-
can labor unions, environmentalists, and other public interest groups to 
mandatory standards, set and implemented by the federal government. 
These groups have succeeded in bringing about significant changes from the 
previous policies based on decentralized controls and voluntary compliance, 
but there is an ironic twist to their victory. Voluntary standards and guide-
lines, such as those used in pre-OSHA days, can be determined on the basis 
of "health-only" criteria, since they are not meant to be regulatory instru-
ments but only to supply scientific inputs to subsequent decisions. Manda-
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tory standards, on the other hand, are policy tools, and as such must in-
clude, more or less explicitly, considerations of costs and benefits. To put 
it bluntly, one cannot object to the intrusion of economic and other non-
health considerations in the regulatory process, to the trading of "lives for 
dollars," and at the same time insist on centralized statutory controls. Even 
the Soviets have found it necessary to operate with a dual set of standards, 
and it has already been suggested that their system may have some 
advantages over present American practices. 
Fortunately, these are not the only possible alternatives. At least in the 
area of occupational safety and health, the West European model-in 
which standards are generally regarded as guidelines, inspectors have con-
siderable discretionary power, and health and safety are regarded as the 
joint responsibility of management and labor-prefigures interesting pos-
sibilities of self-regulation that are absent in both the American and the 
Soviet systems. 
Self-regulation 
One of the most significant characteristics differentiating the West 
European from the American approach to occupational health and safety 
is the greater reliance of the former on voluntary, rather than legally en-
forceable, standards. Although extensive listings of maximum acceptable 
concentrations (MACs) for toxic substances and other environmental lim-
its (many of them of American origin) are regularly published by non-
governmental and public research institutes, they typically represent noth-
ing more than information to be used by the inspectors for the purpose of 
giving preventive advice and monitoring working conditions. 
Good reasons for not embedding MAC values and other numerical 
standards in legal codes have been given by the Institut National de 
Securite of the French Ministry of Labor and Participation: 20 
We consider in effect that the individual reactions produced by a 
material are too unpredictable to permit fixing in a general fashion a 
margin of safety; that results obtained by animal experimentation are 
inapplicable as concerns the levels obtained by this manner; that the 
proposed criteria lacked comparability as to methods of investigation 
used, as well as biological response assayed and analytical methodolo-
gies, all of which are not uniform from one country to another or in 
the same country from laboratory to laboratory. 
In addition to a limited number of MAC values, the Institut National de 
Securite issues extensive "Fiches Toxicologiques" which give detailed in-
formation on physical, chemical, and toxicological characteristics of dif-
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ferent substances. Private organizations, such as the Association Interpro-
fessionelle des Centres Medicaux et Sociaux of the Paris region also 
publish their own Fiches Toxicologiques and extensive MAC listings, partly 
adapted from the lists of the American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, basic research in occupl)..t,im.ial 
standards is done by the nongovernmental Commission for the Evaluation 
of Toxic Materials in the Workplace (Senatskommission zur Priifung 
gesundheitsschiidlicher A rbeitsstofje). This commission was created in 
1955 by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft-the central organ of self-
management of German scientific institutions-with the explicit goal of 
reducing excessive dependence on American standards. One of the impor-
tant functions of the commission is to provide scientific advice to regional 
and national parliaments and governments, and to local authorities. So far, 
the commission has produced MAC listings concerning more than 400 
substances. These MAC values are based only on health criteria; considera-
tions of technical or economic feasibility are excluded. 
German MAC values, like their French equivalents, are not embedded 
in legal codes, and can be modified and improved at any moment. On the 
other hand, they may be made compulsory for the purpose of occupational 
health control simply by publishing them in Arbeitsschutz, a specialized 
journal published by the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 
Guidelines for the practical applications of the standards by federal and 
state factory inspectorates are issued by a Committee for Dangerous Ma-
terials in the Workplace (Ausschu/3 fur gefiihrliche Arbeitsstofje), which is 
set up by the Ministry of Labor and includes representatives of the 
Senatskommission. These guidelines interpret the MAC values in the light 
of existing technical and economic constraints. 
In the United Kingdom, too, no specific legal status applies to occupa-
tional health standards; but values derived from the ACGIH threshold limit 
values, and from other sources, are adopted by the Factory Inspectorate of 
the Department of Employment for purposes of control and surveillance. 
In addition to serving as guides for administrative action, such values may 
be used in enforcement proceedings under the provisions of the Factory 
Act of 1961. 
From the United Kingdom have come the most clearly articulated pro-
posals in recent years for a switch in emphasis away from an extensive use 
of statutory regulations toward greater reliance on voluntary standards and 
codes. These proposals are presented in Safety and Health at Work, the 
official report of a Parliamentary committee appointed in May 1970 by the 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity under the chairman-
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ship of Lord Robens. 26 Among the recommendations made by the Robens 
Committee, the following are particularly relevant to the present dis-
cussion: 27 
1. Wherever practicable, regulations should be confined to statements 
of broad requirements in terms of the objectives to be achieved. 
2. In future, no statutory regulation should be made before detailed 
consideration has been given to whether objectives might ade-
quately be met by a non-statutory code of practice or standard. 
3. Greater emphasis should be placed on standard-setting by means 
of non-statutory codes and standards. As a general rule, statutory 
regulations should only be made when the alternative of a non-
statutory code or standard has been fully explored and found 
wanting. 
4. The whole regulatory system should be more flexibly based and 
more discriminating. The means used should encourage industry 
to deal with more of its own problems, thereby enabling official 
regulation to be more effectively concentrated on serious problems 
where strict official regulation is appropriate and necessary. 
These recommendations follow from the belief that statutory regulations 
are largely ineffective, intrinsically rigid, and prone to rapid obsolescence. 
On the other hand, "Standards and codes developed within industry and 
by independent bodies are, over a large part of the field, more practical and 
therefore potentially more effective instruments of progress than statutory 
regulations." 28 The report concludes that what is needed is "less law" and 
more provision for voluntary self-regulation at the plant level. 
However, in order to provide credible sanctions when needed, inspectors 
should have the power, without reference to the courts, to issue formal 
Improvement Notices-i.e., orders to comply not only with any relevant 
statutory regulation, but also with any relevant voluntary code or standard 
that has been formally approved by the Authority for Safety and Health at 
Work. Voluntary codes and standards would also be admissible evidence 
in proceedings before tribunals (the Robens Report suggests that appeals 
against improvement notices should be heard not in the criminal courts but 
by the industrial tribunals set up under the 1964 Industrial Training Act) . 
In cases where serious hazards or imminent dangers exist, the inspector 
could issue a Prohibition Notice ordering that, in the event of non-
compliance within the stated time limit, the use of specified plant, ma-
chinery, processes, or premises must be discontinued, or continued only 
under specific conditions. 
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But insuring compliance with mm1mum legal requirements is not the 
main task of the inspectorate. Rather, inspectors should be concerned with 
the broad aspects of safety and health organization at the workplace they 
visit, as much as with those narrow aspects which may have been made the 
subject of detailed statutory regulations. "We believe," the report states, 
"that, as a matter of explicit policy, the provision of skilled and impartial 
advice and assistance should be the leading edge of the unified in-
spectorate. "29 
The provision of advice to industry and commerce, and the enforcement 
of sanctions where necessary, should be regarded as inseparable elements 
of inspection work under a policy that has as its prime objective the pre-
vention of accidents and ill health and the promotion of progressively 
better standards at work. The success of such a policy requires close 
cooperation with the people who are exposed to the risks-the workers 
themselves: 30 
It should be as natural for inspectors to discuss safety and health 
problems with workpeople and their representatives as it is to discuss 
them with management. ... We are convinced that more contact 
and dialogue between inspectors and workpeople would not only 
greatly assist the inspectors in their day-to-day work, but would also 
make an invaluable contribution towards increasing the involvement 
of workpeople in the fight against safety and health hazards. 
The Robens Report raises a large number of regulatory issues that can-
not be adequately dealt with here. But at least one problem must be men-
tioned here, for it is of central importance from the viewpoint of compara-
tive analysis: To what extent may the recommendations of the committee 
be generalized to countries other than the United Kingdom? And, more 
generally, what are the functional requisites for a viable system of self-
regulation and voluntary compliance? Three conditions seem to be essen-
tial: ( 1) a critical mass of highly qualified and incorruptible inspectors; 
(2) the availability of significant penalties for serious violations; and 
( 3) an active concern on the part of management and workers and their 
representatives for the quality of the environment in the workplace. 
In a number of countries of Western Europe, these conditions are at least 
approximately satisfied."1 In particular, issues of occupational health and 
safety play an increasingly important role in collective bargaining and 
trade-union policies. In France and Italy, for example, unions of different 
ideological persuasions have consistently refused, in recent years, to trade 
off health risks for higher wages. They have also been very active in inform-
ing their members about such risks and in mobilizing public support for 
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preventive measures. Their example is now being followed in other Euro-
pean countries, as the following episode illustrates. In 1980, the Swiss 
Union of Textile, Chemical, and Paper Workers (GTCP) issued a well-
written popular report, Gesundheit am A rbeitsplatz, which provided infor-
mation about the major problems of occupational health and stress, and 
outlined a model for workers' monitoring and control of health problems at 
the workplace. This includes the systematic collection of environmental and 
health data at the plant level, by means of report cards to be mailed di-
rectly to union headquarters in Zurich for central evaluation. Interestingly 
enough, Gesundheit am Arbeitsplatz is the German translation of an 
analogous document prepared by the Italian Union of Metal Workers-
a politically much more radical organization than its Swiss counterpart. 
Some American analysts doubt that a system of self-regulation would 
work in the United States. American inspectors do not share the prestige 
and long tradition of their European colleagues, and also their training is 
apparently not as good. The pre-OSHA experience with "consensus stan-
dards" voluntarily adopted by industry under lax supervision by the states 
has been sharply criticized by labor unions and public interest groups. In 
fact, national labor organizations have been among the most determined 
supporters of compulsory federal regulation.32 
It is probably true that passage of the OSH Act has initially strengthened 
the position of the union leadership in relation to management, to the rank 
and file and their local representatives (to whom financial gains are of more 
immediate interest than improved working conditions), and to the un-
organized member of the workforce. Yet even the most ardent supporters 
of federal regulation cannot by now fail to see the intrinsic limitations of 
the present regulatory structure. That OSHA has managed to produce only 
ten health standards in ten years is something that cannot be explained in 
terms of incompetence or poor management; its roots lie in basic am-
biguities in regulatory philosophy and in a poor choice of policy tools. 
The acute dissatisfaction with OSHA's standard-setting and enforcement 
activities has elicited a number of suggestions for how policy might be 
improved. Among the alternative strategies that have been proposed, regu-
lation through collective bargaining is perhaps the most promising. In the 
words of a recent writer: 33 
It may make sense to involve unions in abating hazards in the work-
place, rather than relying exclusively on governmental regulation and 
inspection. . . . To the extent that labor and management can be 
induced to negotiate health and safety rules within the context of the 
collective bargaining agreement, we can decentralize some aspects of 
the regulatory intervention mechanisms almost to the plant level. In 
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theory, this should produce investments in occupational health and 
safety, that are both more efficient and more effective than those 
produced by the present system alone. 
The rich experience of the European labor movement in the area of 
occupational health and safety could be of considerable help in designing 
a strategy of regulation through collective bargaining adapted to the Ameri-
can context. For this reason, that experience deserves to be carefully 
studied by American analysts. 
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